
25X1 ARTELLOFAX Approved For Release 2004/01/22 : CIA-RDP82-00457R007900480008-9 CLASSIFICATION COM CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO. INFORMATION REPORT CD NO. DATE DISTR. 14 June 1951 COUNTRY Indochina NO. OF PAGES SUBJECT Acquisition of War Materiel by the 3 Democratic Republic of Vietnam 25X1C NO. OF ENCLS. 25X1 SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. THE DOCUPENT CONVAINS INFORMATION APPECITIES THE MATIGNAL DEFENSE OF THE CHIVED STATES STITLIS THE SEARING OF THE ESPICIACE ACT SO D, G. C., 31 AND 32. AS AUGUNDD. ITS TRANSLIGISTION OF THE EXPLAINOR OF ITS CONVENTS IS ACT SEARCH TO AN DEASTHORIZED PERSON SO PRO-SENTED DY LAW. SEPECIAL CONTROL OF THE SCREEN FRONISHED. THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 25X1 Chinese Communist Military Assistance Chinese Communist General TRANH Canha returned to Kunming in late 1950 after a military inspection tour of North Vietnam. He was accompanied by Col. Thanh Phong, a delegate of Vo Nguyen Giap, Commander-in-Chief of Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) forces, with whom TRANH had drawn up the following agreement: In return for Vietnamese cereals to be sent to South China, the Chinese Communists would dispatch munitions as well as technical

- and military advisors to assist in the development of DRV artillery and motorized units.
- b. Six Chinese Communist divisions would be massed on the China-Vietnam frontier under CHU Chia-pi** who fought with Ho Chi Minh forces against the Chinese Nationalist troops in the frontier area during 1947-48. This massing of troops was designed only to bolster the morale of DRV forces; the Chinese Communists will not enter Vietnam unless forced to retreat by a Chinese Nationalist invasion of South China. In this case they would join DRV forces in an offensive against the French.
- In order to implement the first part of the agreement, 3-5,000 troops and civilians In Intersector III were ordered to transport about 30 kilograms of cereal each to Caobang. The munitions provided by the Chinese Communists were brought back by the troops on the return trip.
- Chinese Communist supplies for the DRV are usually delivered by truck from Yunnan via Trung Khanh Phu (106-31, 22-50) to Caobang, where the DRV has established a central bureau for the reception of these materials. This bureau, directed by Nguyen Thanh Nam, a Sino-Vietnamese, handles requests for munitions originated by all the DRV military units
- In addition to this principal supply channel, the DRV has organized External 4. Commerce Services in various coastal regions such as Doson (106-47, 20-43), Diem Dien (106-34, 20-34) and Mon Cay, where Chinese merchants act as inter-



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mediaries in the exchange of products such as opium, grain, gold and coffee, for munitions.

- 5. The Chinese Communists also send supplies by air once every three months to the Chiem Roa (105-17, 22-08) airfield.
- 6. The DRV has expressed a special need of the following items:
 - s. Heavy artillery, motorcycles, trucks, fuel, mine detonators and shells, for its armored unit (sic).
 - b. Lathes, milling machines, planes and drills, for DRV munitions factories.
- 7. The recent slow-down in the dispetch of Chinese Communist material to the DRV may be explained by the following factors:
 - a. Fear of a Chinese Nationalist invasion of South China.
 - b. Chinese Communist losses in Korea,
 - c. Distruct of LU Han and LUNG Yun, former Governors of Yunnan who subsequently joined the Communists, as well of LONG Tamests, the son of LUNG Yun, by Chinese Communist officials.
 - d. Criticism of the extremist policies of CHU Chis-pi**, by the troops under his command.

Local Production of War Materiel by the DRV

- 8. The DRV now has two important military construction workshops: in Ninh Binh, near the Ninh Binh-Thanh Hoa border, and in Thai Nguyen. Workshops of lesser importance scattered throughout the provinces are capable of producing mines, grenades, naval mines, pistols, Sten-type machine guns, and all types of shells and cartridges.
- 9. On the orders of the Director of the Armament Department, production has begun on the following items:
 - a. Hollow-charge weapons: Bazookas, which were first used by the DRV on the "So Front" in Sontay in late 1948; 35 mm to 60 mm anti-tank guns; and a recoilless cannon of 60 mm to 88 mm, "SKZ" model**** produced in early 1950.
 - b. Rockets, which have been in use since June 1949. A rocket was fired on flanci on 28 June 1949.
- 10. The following is a list of war material which the DRV is capable of producin; locally together with the individuals responsible for their development:
 - a. Sulphuric acid, melinite and fulmicotton

Professor Pham Dinh Ai

b. Cast iron and saltpeter

Engineer Vo Quy Huan

c. Black gumpowder and chlorated gumpowder

Engineer Ho Dac Vy

d. Olycerines

Dr. Pham Van Huyen

 Basockas, mortars, recoilless cannon (SKZ), and anti-tank guns

General Tran Dai Nghia

f. Steem hammers

Tran Ve, Director of the Phu Tho workshop

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25X1A	サ	Comment. a also contains a reference to TRAN Canh.	
	**	Comment. Although CHU Chia-pi was in command of troops on the Yunnan-Vietnam border in late 1950 , recent available information, dated March 1951, indicates that CHU has been transferred to Paoshan to direct Communist guerrilla activity in north Burma.	ı
25X1A	#於# ####	Comment. This information was also reported in Comment. It is believed that LUNG Yun has four sons, LUNG Shung-wu, LUNG Shung-tsu, LUNG Shung-wen and LUNG Shung-hsun; his third son, LUNG Shung-tsun was killed in mid-1950. It is not clear to which one reference is made.	25X1A
25X1A	*************************************	Gomment. According to the report of an independent agency, the "SKZ", used during the Vinh Yen battle of mid-January 1951, is produced in 81 mm and 120 mm types.	

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